Studia Theologica 2020, 22(1):137-159 | DOI: 10.5507/sth.2019.044956
This study challenges some interpretative strategies comparing Leibniz’s, or even Newton’s metaphysics of space to a Cartesian one. Not only did both Newton and Leibniz explicitly oppose Cartesian metaphysics as such, but neither of them had even the slightest intention of separating space from God, although they did not agree on the exact nature of such a space-God relationship. Moreover, it was just a conceptual disagreement, since the identification of space with an attribute of God is to be found not only by Leibniz but also by Newton, as well as by his defender Samuel Clarke. Neither diverge the reasons why Leibniz no more than Clarke eventually argued for the category of modification rather than an attribute.
Vloženo: srpen 2019; Přijato: říjen 2019; Zveřejněno: srpen 2020
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